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While the subject of forgiveness, especially in the wake of the work of Hannah 
Arendt and Jacques Derrida, has received a great deal of philosophical attention, 
self-forgiveness remains relatively neglected, although the literature has begun 
to grow in recent years. This neglect may be in part due to Arendt’s famous 
argument in The Human Condition that self-forgiveness is not possible.1 My paper 
proposes to revisit Arendt’s arguments to investigate their import and explore 
how dismissals of self-forgiveness, including those that take Arendt’s arguments 
seriously, could have been too hasty. 
Self-forgiveness raises special puzzles of self-relation. Arendt argues that 
forgiving, like promising, depends on plurality, others being with us and acting: 
“For no-one can forgive himself … forgiving and promising enacted in solitude or 
isolation remain without reality and can signify no more than a role played before 
oneself.”2 She believes that we need to be forgiven by others in order to escape 
the consequences of our deeds. Rather dramatically, she suggests that we are like 
“the sorcerer’s apprentice” without the incantation to break a magic spell, most 
likely a reference to the 1797 Goethe poem of that name.3 While the master is 
away, the apprentice casts a spell that makes a broom carry water and nothing he 
does, including splitting the broom in two, can stop it from filling the house with 
water. Only the master, on his return, can tell the magic word that will send the 
broom back into the cupboard. In order to be forgiven, we must await the magic 
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word from another.
To be more specific, Arendt believes that we cannot forgive ourselves as we cannot 
be both the subject and object of experience. Furthermore, she argues that the 
most profound reason that we cannot forgive ourselves is that “we are dependent 
on others, to whom we appear in a distinctness that we ourselves are unable to 
perceive. Closed within ourselves, we would never be able to forgive ourselves 
any failing or transgression because we would lack the experience of the person 
for the sake of whom one can forgive.”4 On this view, we are dependent on others 
to forgive us, as we do not appear to ourselves as we appear to others. 
While Arendt’s discussion is often taken to concern personal forgiveness in 
general, a great deal of light can be shed on her views by reminding ourselves 
that the forgiveness she is describing is political, not personal. In her account 
of forgiveness, Arendt is writing about the public sphere, where relations with 
others are paramount, and they “determine the extent and modes in which one 
may be able to forgive himself.”5 
There are a number of ways that focusing on the political perspective alters our 
understanding of Arendt’s claims. First, it could be argued that while we cannot 
forgive ourselves, we can come to some sort of accommodation with ourselves. 
She refers to a similar idea in her discussion of the two-in-one dialogue in which 
we need to live with ourselves, where she is focusing on personal morality, as I will 
discuss below. The other openings left by Arendt are in her hints that forgiveness 
of self is determined and dependent on the forgiveness of others in its extent and 
modes. I argue that it may be possible for perpetrators to develop their own moral 
response to their acts, in some respects, which may include self-forgiveness or at 
least an attempt to come to terms with their past actions, so I examine the nature 
of the self in self-forgiveness, its relation to the forgiveness of others, and the 
phenomenology and psychology of self-forgiveness. Furthermore, I explore the 
implications of the possibility of self-forgiveness for the ethics of self-forgiveness 
in terms of the kind and extremity of wrongs we can forgive ourselves, and our 
reasons for doing so. 
1. POLITICAL AND PERSONAL FORGIVENESS
Arendt’s examples of forgiveness are of legal and political notions of sparing 
the vanquished or commuting a sentence, actions that clearly cannot be applied 
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to the self. The possibility of self-pardon has been considered by several US 
Presidents, such as Richard Nixon, George Bush (Senior) and Bill Clinton, but 
none have done it so far, and the idea is understandably controversial.6 Rather 
a judge or state leader makes these kinds of decisions as a parallel to personal 
forgiveness. Thus her argument looks more like the claim that self-forgiveness is 
dependent on political or state forgiveness. It is notable in these examples that it 
is not the victim who forgives and so suggests that the nature of the forgiveness 
is different from interpersonal forgiveness. This characterisation of forgiveness 
in the political context is the first clue to how personal self-forgiveness might 
be possible, even on Arendt’s account. While a person cannot decide their own 
sentence for a crime, they might be able to consider whether their action was 
forgivable. 
Thus, we need to clarify the difference between forgiving the self and pardoning 
the self, for pardoning is closer in meaning to political forgiveness. First, how can 
we distinguish between forgiving and pardoning in general? For Paul M. Hughes, 
pardoning involves releasing the wrongdoer from the consequences of their 
actions and so is incompatible with punishment and compatible with condoning 
the wrong, whereas forgiveness is compatible with punishment and not with 
condoning.7 However, this way of distinguishing the two is not quite correct as 
pardoning may occur after some form of punishment, and be made for other 
reasons, such as the perpetrator has served enough time, the punishment seemed 
inappropriate, they are found to be innocent, legal anomalies and so on. An example 
of formal pardon in Australia when the accused or convicted is found innocent 
is the case of Lindy Chamberlain.8 Pardoning, in English (unlike in French), is 
generally associated with “an official acting on behalf of the society or the state,”9 
although in everyday speech we might use “pardoning” to refer to interpersonal 
relations. The other aspect of Hughes’ claim is right, in that pardoning could be 
compatible with condoning, since it might be judged that the person had not really 
done anything wrong and forgiving could never (correctly) mean that. When we 
forgive we do so in the knowledge of the original transgression. In any case, this 
way of looking at the question does not help us to interpret Arendt’s ideas, since 
her concern is with political forgiveness, a kind of pardon that is compatible with 
punishment, as I said.10 She stresses that even pardon is for the person, saying “no 
pardon pardons murder or theft but only the murderer or the thief.”11 
So let’s look at self-forgiving and self-pardoning. Given that Arendt’s view of 
forgiveness in the political realm is a kind of mercy or pardoning, self-forgiveness 
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here would consist in pardoning oneself for a crime one has committed against 
others. It is easy to see why she does not believe this is possible, as it is not 
part of any past or existing system of law or politics and is unlikely to ever be. 
Judgements about crimes in this sense are made by others.12 Another possibility, 
although Arendt does not consider this idea, is that a political leader might forgive 
themselves, and do so in a public way. To understand how that could happen, 
we need to shift the ground from the political and public to the private and 
personal and ask if self-forgiveness is possible then. One of the hurdles Arendt 
puts up against self-forgiveness is that we do not have the right kind of relation 
to ourselves. We can concede that we cannot pardon ourselves of crimes as if we 
were a judge or state power, but is it true that we do not experience ourselves or 
appear to ourselves in the right way to forgive ourselves? Or in other words, what 
kind of a self must we be to forgive ourselves?  
Let’s think of a recent, fictional example in order to understand the structure 
of self-forgiveness in general—from The Wire.13 Roland “Prez” Prysbylewski 
(played by Jim True-Frost) is a police officer who retires and becomes a public 
schoolteacher after the fatal accidental shooting of a plainclothes colleague 
who is African-American. (The character and events are based on the real-life 
experiences of Ed Burns, producer and writer for The Wire.) Immediately after the 
shooting he is desperate and has to be kept in a cell on suicide watch. We see him 
much later, calm, and dedicating himself to his work as a teacher. He takes special 
interest in a poor boy, Duquan “Dukie” Weems, even washing his clothes so he 
will have clean clothes for school. Although his efforts to protect this particular 
child are ultimately unsuccessful after the boy is put in a group home, we can 
think of Prez as a person who has truly acknowledged his wrong, has tried to 
make amends, and as someone who may be able to forgive himself. I raise this 
example so that we have a sense of a person who has forgiven themselves and 
how they might go about it before we consider some of the questions concerning 
self-forgiveness. 
2. WHAT KIND OF SELF IS PRESUPPOSED FOR SELF-FORGIVENESS? 
In The Human Condition, Arendt argues that we cannot appear to ourselves as 
we appear to others, and it seems that we cannot appear in the same way, in that 
others see us as we appear in the public, political space. But could we appear to 
ourselves enough to forgive ourselves? We could reflect on our own actions and 
understand the depth of the harm we have done to others and possibly ourselves. 
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Are we really a what rather than a who for ourselves?14 Could we recognise our own 
individuality? Do we see it reflected back by the view of others? I have thought that 
at the very least Arendt’s position would allow for some kind of accommodation 
with the self, yet it seems that there is a distinction between reconciling with 
the self and forgiving oneself. However, it is not obvious that reconciliation or 
accommodation with the self is any easier to make sense of than forgiveness of 
the self, at least in so far as they raise similar issues of self-relationship. So I will 
see if there are threads in Arendt’s work that enable us to reconsider this question.
In a later lecture, “Thinking and moral considerations,” Arendt discusses the 
idea that we can have a two-in-one dialogue where we need to learn to live with 
ourselves in a harmonious state, saying “in a sense I also am for myself though 
I hardly appear to me.”15 We should bear in mind that in this discussion Arendt 
is focusing on thinking rather than acting. In this focus she comes closer to the 
question of personal forgiveness; at the same time she moves away from the 
consequences of actions, an issue I will return to when considering what kinds 
of wrongs we can forgive ourselves. For her, this inner dialogue is what we call 
consciousness, and she takes the point further, suggesting that “I am not only for 
others but for myself, and in this latter case, I clearly am not just one. A difference 
is inserted into my Oneness.”16 Although Arendt believes we primarily appear to 
others, for ourselves we are two-in-one in “Being-conscious-of-myself.” This two 
in one can have an inner dialogue and be both in harmony and out of harmony 
with itself, a concept that she associates with Socrates’ dictum that we need to 
be in harmony with ourselves.17 Thus there seems to be some room in her overall 
thinking for some kind of self-relationship. 
We have to be able to refer to ourselves in self-forgiveness, and create a certain 
unity of past, present, and future in the self.18 I would argue that we can distinguish 
these aspects without being committed to a self of distinct components. In 
contrast, Kathryn Norlock, considering forgiveness from a feminist perspective, 
suggests that forgiveness is a commitment to “the set of relationships between 
one’s past, current, and future selves.”19 Yet this idea seems to differentiate 
between parts of the self and suggest that a concept of a split self is required.20 
She contends that we need to conceptualise a fragmented self to make sense of 
self-forgiveness. For her, the ordinary self is fragmented, yet the traumatised self, 
often the self in need of forgiveness, is even more so. What Norlock means is that 
we are structurally and socially fragmented in our identities as well as unstable.21 
However, there are different kinds and degrees of fragmentation, and it is not 
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incompatible with projects of unity and integrity. Susan Brison, a philosopher 
who survived a serious assault, sees the traumatised person who has been abused 
or suffers from eating disorders, for instance, as having conflicting self-concepts, 
some of which can be seen as separate. Self-deception also plays an important 
role in distancing connections within the self. 
Norlock argues against Arendt’s idea that we only appear to others thus: “In 
accounts of those who have been both victims and perpetrators of evils, sometimes 
the gray agent has the most information about the wrongs done and their 
magnitude.”22 The “gray” agent is the person who has been forced or pressured 
to harm others. For example, only Primo Levi knew the choices he made in the 
concentration camp until he chose to share them. The basis of her argument is that 
others’ knowledge of us, especially our ethical lives, is incomplete. This approach 
may miss part of Arendt’s argument, in that Arendt is not so much discussing the 
amount of knowledge others have of us compared to our own, but discussing the 
different stance and relation others have to us. Yet I believe that Norlock’s point 
is relevant to the examples of personal rather than political forgiveness. From 
her starting perspective, we are all split in multiple ways, both synchronically and 
diachronically and what we need to do in self-forgiveness is create a narrative 
unity, but not necessarily a narrative unity that removes or covers over all sense 
of fragmentation. Her view ties in with Arendt’s, suggesting that in some ways we 
take an external perspective on ourselves in order to forgive, and also implying 
that forgiveness of self is related to the forgiveness of others in that we take 
that perspective. Thinking of self-forgiveness like this to some extent vindicates 
Arendt’s claim that “the extent and modes of self-forgiveness is dependent on 
the forgiveness of others.”23 This claim itself requires further explanation, to 
understand the similarities and differences between the two kinds of forgiveness, 
so I will consider that question next. 
3. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-FORGIVENESS AND 
FORGIVENESS OF OTHERS?
Arendt’s assertion is that the only way that we can understand self-forgiveness is 
through forgiveness of others, so let’s first see the connections. For the purposes 
of this discussion I am only considering self-forgiveness for wrongs that affect 
others. I will turn to the question of harms to ourselves further on.  
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The two kinds of forgiveness have to be connected in their overall conception of 
forgiveness, and be distinct from other ideas such as condoning or legal pardon.24 
A psychologist writing on the issue, Robert Enright, appears to address Arendt’s 
argument against self-forgiveness although he does not refer to her work. Self-
forgiveness might be dismissed on the grounds that we cannot be both our own 
defendant and judge. However, he says, “This argument confuses legal pardon and 
forgiveness. In the latter, we are not reducing a deserved punishment, as in legal 
pardon, but instead are welcoming ourselves back into the human community.”25 
This is an important point, in distinguishing personal self-forgiveness from legal 
or political punishment, just as interpersonal forgiveness can be distinguished 
from legal pardon, as I have argued. Nevertheless, we could consider whether we 
can continue to punish ourselves in an attenuated sense and to forgive ourselves, 
as is possible in the case of forgiveness of others. This problem can be addressed 
by taking it that, as in interpersonal forgiveness, we can forgive, but will still have 
some hard feelings, and we might think that we cannot trust ourselves in certain 
areas of our lives. 
Another connection between forgiveness of others and self-forgiveness is that 
they both can be ethically generous to others. We forgive others partly so that 
they can transform their lives, and sometimes we forgive ourselves so that we can 
contribute to the lives of others.26 In other words, as we respect ourselves more, 
we are more likely to extend that respect to others. Instead of being wrapped 
up in our own self-flagellation, we are able to open to others on a grounding of 
respect. Also, unforgiving of ourselves, we may be unforgiving of others. Oedipus’ 
curse on his sons Polynices and Eteocles, that they will kill each other, suggest 
that he cannot forgive himself, although he protests his banishment.27 Joseph 
Conrad’s Lord Jim is an excellent example of the dangers involved in not forgiving 
oneself. As Robin Dillon notes in her account of self-forgiveness and self-respect, 
Jim cannot forgive himself for being the sort of person he thinks he is, that is, 
a coward.28 When the Patna, the ship on which Jim is chief mare, appears to be 
about to sink, he jumps into a lifeboat with other crew members, leaving the 800 
passengers to their fate. Luckily, the ship does not sink and all the passengers 
survive, but Jim is tried and stripped of his seamen’s license. His mistake in the 
past colours all his relationships, his judgement of himself, and his capacity to act, 
ultimately leading him to give up the love of his life, Jewell, and his own life in 
refusing to defend himself. He seems to have accepted his father’s claim that “who 
once gives way to temptation, in the very instant hazards his total depravity and 
everlasting ruin.”29 We could ask whether the former captain of the sunken Costa 
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Concordia, Francesco Schettino, is going through similar tortures, but his recent 
(August 2014) lecture to a Roman university on emergency procedures would 
suggest otherwise.30 This argument that we need to forgive ourselves in order to 
protect those we love provides self-forgiveness with a crucial ethical implication 
for others that overcomes Arendt’s sense of our being shut up within ourselves. 
We need to forgive ourselves precisely in order not to be shut away from others, 
to open ourselves to them. 
Of course, there are important differences between self and other forgiveness 
as well, but these are surprisingly difficult to pin down. One idea, suggested by 
Enright, is that “[u]nlike interpersonal forgiveness, which is philosophically 
distinct from reconciliation, self-forgiveness and reconciliation with self are 
always linked.”31 There is a point to this claim in that the processes of self-
forgiveness and reconciliation will be connected in that we cannot escape the self 
in the same way we can avoid the other; nevertheless they are still philosophically 
distinct processes.32 The process of self-forgiveness, according to Lin Bauer et.al., 
involves a growing sense of ease with oneself that includes taking responsibility 
for one’s mistakes and feeling at home in the world. They conclude that self-
forgiveness ultimately means becoming part of the human community again.33 
In this account, reconciliation is the outcome of forgiveness, and suggests that if 
we are able to reconcile ourselves without forgiving ourselves, a sense of unease 
should remain, although that may not be so. 
We can see that in the case of Judah Rosenthal in Woody Allen’s Crimes and 
Misdemeanours,34 who becomes reconciled with himself but does not forgive 
himself. Rosenthal hires a killer to murder his girlfriend after she threatens to 
expose their affair. It seems to me that he does not forgive himself because he 
fails to properly acknowledge his wrong. Rosenthal appears to acknowledge the 
crime when he is first troubled by what he has done, but ultimately rather than 
doing so he moves on and forgets it, partly because no-one else finds out about it 
and he is able to go on living very similarly to how he lived before the murder. He 
enjoys his relationship with his partner, family, friends, and patients; in short, all 
of his life. Thus the claim of a tight connection between self-reconciliation and 
self-forgiveness, in contrast to interpersonal forgiveness, is not borne out.
It is sometimes true that not forgiving the self is even more painful than not forgiving 
others. Enright sees lacking forgiveness as necessarily negative and painful, but 
we may not experience this suffering, particularly if we forget what others have 
hannah arendt and self-forgiveness · 47 
done to us. However, in our own case, we may continue to find it painful because 
we continue to punish ourselves in some way and hold hard feelings towards 
ourselves.35 This point implies that there is more of a psychological imperative to 
forgive oneself than to forgive others.
Another possibility is that there is a proper order between self-forgiveness 
and forgiveness, with one or the other coming first and enabling the second. 
Philosopher and psychoanalyst Jon K. Mills suggests that self-forgiveness come 
first, and enables forgiveness of the other. His argument is that “If we do not 
initiate the process of self-forgiveness prior to interpersonal forgiveness, then we 
are placing responsibility on the other and refusing to accept radical responsibility 
for our ontological obligation.36 His point here can be challenged, as although we 
should not avoid responsibility, when we have wronged another we have in some 
way made ourselves dependent on them. That cannot reasonably be denied. What 
can be taken from Mills’ argument, nonetheless, is that we do need to begin the 
process of self-forgiveness for that is a full acknowledgement of the wrong and 
this acknowledgement is also necessary for the forgiveness of the other.37 
Could it be the case then that others have to forgive first from an ethical perspective, 
before self-forgiveness is possible? While this view may have some prima facie 
appeal, it encounters problems in being too dependent on victims’ good will, 
which appears unjust. For example, Margaret R. Holmgren argues that the victim 
does not have to forgive the offender before they forgive themselves, although 
the offender must acknowledge their crime, take responsibility, and apologise or 
otherwise make amends to the victim.38 (This view takes into account that victims 
may unreasonably withhold their forgiveness, as I will discuss later on.) These 
conciliatory gestures towards victims facilitate self-forgiveness.39 It makes sense 
that the steps taken of acknowledgement and conciliation also concern our own 
possibility of self-forgiveness. So what we can take from this discussion is that 
while steps should be taken to enable the forgiveness of others, it is not necessarily 
prior to self-forgiveness.40 
However, there are other experiential, phenomenological concerns that mean 
the forgiveness of others comes first, or a link to others is essential. Without a 
connection with others, or some level of care, we stay locked in a cycle of self-
recrimination. As Dillon observes, self-forgiveness is connected to that of others, 
which “can be useful, even necessary.”41 This point is one that links with Arendt’s 
declaration that only others can forgive.42 The weaker version here is that we need 
48 · marguerite la caze  
the help of others to forgive the self.43 If we go back to the example of Prez, the 
trust of the children, the feeling of doing good for others, of making something 
valuable in his life through others, is what made him able to forgive himself. These 
ideas show there is truth in Arendt’s claim that the extent to which we can forgive 
ourselves is dependent on others. The problem she points to suggests that we 
cannot forgive ourselves if we are entirely alone and shut up within ourselves, 
so others have to play some role in our self-forgiveness, even if it is a memory 
of others’ love in the past or an imagining of their forgiveness. In Three Colours: 
Blue it is the small pleasures of life, and feeling compassion for her neighbour that 
start to bring Julie back to life and perhaps to self-forgiveness, if she has somehow 
reproached herself after the death of her husband and daughter.44 Our relation to 
others can bring us to self-forgiveness. Arne Johan Vetlesen further notes that 
self-forgiveness can also serve as an example to others. Citing Hitler’s secretary 
Traudl Junge’s statement of self-forgiveness in a documentary about her life, 
Vetlesen suggests that because she has gone through a “critical self-examination” 
and accepted blame and not excuses for her blindness about Hitler and his actions, 
her process of self-forgiveness could be worthy of emulation, and is at least the 
beginning of a process of forgiveness by others.45 We need the concern and trust 
of others to help us with the spell we need to go through that process, and our 
self-forgiveness can be of relevance to others in similar situations. So how do we 
forgive ourselves? What is the phenomenology of self-forgiveness? 
4. HOW DO WE FORGIVE OURSELVES? 
The phenomenology and psychology of forgiveness, in contrast to the ethics of 
forgiveness, is important here to explain the work of self-forgiveness. Derrida 
contends that we shift or oscillate between self-forgiveness and non-self-
forgiveness, writing “There is in me someone who is always ready to forgive and 
another who is absolutely merciless, and we are constantly fighting. Sometimes I 
can sleep, sometimes I cannot.”46 For Derrida, it is the conflict within the self that 
prevents forgiveness, rather than the lack of being able to see ourselves, as Arendt 
maintains. Yet we appear to be able to make sense of not forgiving ourselves and 
if that’s so, then surely we must be able to make sense of forgiving ourselves?47
One of the first difficulties with comprehending exactly how we can forgive 
ourselves is recognising what kind of responses we can have to our own actions. 
For one, is it intelligible that we resent ourselves or be angry with ourselves 
or any of the other negative emotions associated with forgiveness that need 
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to be overcome? Hughes claims that “notwithstanding the fact that people 
may be angry with themselves, experience self-directed loathing, and struggle 
to overcome such negative emotional attitudes, it is not clear that the idea of 
resenting oneself is coherent and, thus, whether forgiveness as overcoming self-
referential resentment is possible.”48 If correct, this impossibility would render 
self-forgiveness distinctly different from forgiveness of others on that ground 
alone. His argument is that the view that one and the same person can be both 
subject and object and victim and wrongdoer “is incompatible with the idea that 
resentment is necessarily directed against other people.”49 
The problem with Hughes’ argument is that it begs the question against those 
who argue that we can resent on behalf of others and resent ourselves. I believe 
we can resent ourselves, feeling that we have failed our own standards and the 
standards of others and have behaved in a way that could be considered unjust to 
both ourselves and others.50 We then look on ourselves as if we were looking at 
another. Norlock adds the point that we often closely identify and empathise with 
others such that it makes sense to call our feelings resentment, and this can be 
the case where we have harmed someone else, and so we can resent ourselves.51 It 
seems to me that we can and do resent ourselves, and so self-forgiveness will be 
in part a process of overcoming or transforming that resentment.
Hughes notes that self-forgiveness needs to be distinguished from self-condoning.52 
This distinction is separate from the distinction I made earlier between personal 
forgiveness and self-forgiveness, and legal pardon. A number of authors refer 
to pseudo self-forgiveness, premature, or non-genuine self-forgiveness to set 
that apart from true self-forgiveness.53 What they have in mind is forgetting or 
overlooking the transgression altogether or forgiving oneself without taking 
responsibility for what one has done, or trying to make amends.54 However, 
proper or genuine self-forgiveness entails an acknowledgement of the wrong one 
has done and acceptance of responsibility for it. If that’s so, it indicates that self-
forgiveness requires a recognition of the wrong done in order to qualify as self-
forgiveness from an ethical point of view. Otherwise it would be more like self-
condoning, as in the example of Judah Rosenthal in Crimes and Misdemeanours. 
From the experiential perspective, self-deception and rationalisation can enable 
the achievement of pseudo self-forgiveness.55 At the very least, we would like to 
believe that Judah Rosenthal does not have the sense of wholeness and harmony 
that someone remorseful and atoning could have. These considerations clear 
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the ground, as it were, for thinking about the affective and intellectual changes 
we might need to go through to forgive ourselves.56 In her account of political 
forgiveness, Arendt stresses only the action aspect, the forgoing of revenge, 
but these other elements are necessary for interpersonal and intrapersonal 
forgiveness.57 
Giving up resentment, as I have already stated, but not all hard feelings, is necessary 
for us to forgive ourselves. We could also forgive ourselves but still remain angry 
with ourselves, although without those feelings dominating more positive ones, 
as Dillon notes.58 Furthermore, self-forgiveness may involve overcoming feelings 
other than forgiving others, such as “embarrassment, disappointment, shame, 
or guilt.”59 We might also feel contempt or even disgust for ourselves. To some 
extent we can overcome remorse and regret and other ethical responses to our 
actions, although not entirely.60 We have to accept that there will be a certain level 
of remorse and self-blame that does not go away after we have forgiven ourselves, 
but which may be brought under control, thereby making it possible to live with 
ourselves. 
So far I have been discussing self-forgiveness without looking at a significant 
question concerning what types of offenses we are able to forgive ourselves. I 
turn to that question now.
5. WHAT KINDS OF WRONGS CAN WE FORGIVE OURSELVES? 
The question of the type of harms we can forgive ourselves, is distinct from the 
question of what extremity of wrongs can be forgiven, which I will consider in the 
following section. There are three possibilities: wrongs done to ourselves, wrongs 
done to others, and wrongs done to ourselves through our wrongs to others, and 
there is controversy over which of these make sense as objects of self-forgiveness. 
It may seem inappropriate to forgive ourselves for wrongs done to others—if only 
the victim of harms can forgive, we would be unethically substituting ourselves 
for the victim. As Derrida states, only the victim can forgive, “The survivor is not 
ready to substitute herself, abusively, for the dead.”61 In other words, we do not 
have the ethical standing to forgive ourselves for what we have done to others. 
This stricture would apply to both self-forgiveness and third-party forgiveness by 
bystanders or others. 
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However, first and most obviously and literally, if the victim is dead or otherwise 
not possible to contact, how could self-forgiveness even be possible?62 Griswold63 
and Hagberg64 claim that in general if the victim is present, then the other 
has to forgive us before we forgive ourselves. This point appears problematic, 
nonetheless; for instance, what if the victim is a heartless and cruel non-forgiver—
should we be chained for the rest of our lives to their whims?65 That possibility has 
to be taken into account, and then the person has to consider what they have done 
from an impartial perspective and reflect on the concerns of the victim.
Second, there may be deeper reasons for turning to self-forgiveness. To demonstrate 
this point, Goldie argues that there are cases where self-forgiveness for wrongs 
to others is necessary because there are moral reasons preventing the victim 
forgiving us, for example, if we have disloyal thoughts or have done something 
disloyal behind a person’s back.66 Should we go and announce what we have done 
in order to gain their forgiveness? Norlock makes the even more profound point 
that as part of the process of becoming a more ethical person, we may need to 
begin to forgive ourselves even when the victim cannot.67 She believes it may be 
imperfect, but that’s what we have. We should not leave ourselves outside the 
pale, ashamed, perhaps humiliated, and too desperate to improve. There is a 
certain level of disbelief in the possibility of forgiving ourselves for what we have 
done to others.68 As Norlock points out, self-forgiveness has a similar structure 
to what she calls third-party forgiveness, or forgiveness on behalf of the victim. 
Nevertheless, there are a range of situations where self-forgiveness even for what 
we have done to others is ethically demanded. 
There are a variety of ways in which we can harm or injure ourselves and may 
need to at least consider forgiving ourselves.69 Norlock, for example, defines as 
moral harms that may require self-forgiveness those practices that “demean us, 
damage our capacities, or limit the opportunities of our future selves.70 For self-
forgiveness to be in play, there has to be a weighing of the sense in which people 
bear some responsibility even when they are suffering from an illness or being 
oppressed by others. Take the example of an eating disorder, Norlock suggests, 
where although we might not be culpable for having the disorder, we could be 
culpable for hiding it from our loved ones.
Dillon adds that we can be hurt by our own feelings, thoughts, and desires, such as 
racist thoughts and fears or being excited by violence, and these can damage our 
self-respect.71 For instance, Karl Ove Knausgaard in A Man in Love cannot forgive 
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himself for knocking on a woman’s door in the middle of the night, even though 
she did not let him in and he agrees it was nothing.72 I would like to take this 
issue further and consider the way we can wrong ourselves in wronging others, 
say by undermining our own character.73 When we harm or injure others we harm 
ourselves in a range of ways, by letting ourselves down, or by making ourselves a 
lesser person. This feature links to Lisa Tessman’s worry about burdened virtues 
under circumstances of oppression, an aspect of self-forgiveness that Dillon does 
not consider.74 Oppression could structure our lives in ways that make it more 
likely that we do things for which we struggle to forgive ourselves. Oppression 
could also be even worse in the sense that by limiting our options, we may have to 
continue to do such things without hope of transforming ourselves. For instance, 
we could corrupt our own character by being so angry about class injustice, by 
telling lies to oppressors, or by manipulating others, but cannot see or have any 
other way to live. Some of the examples Norlock gives—such as women suffering 
abuse—are relevant here. She notes that victims of abuse feel or are implicated 
in the situation of abuse, and may make some choices and have some sense of 
responsibility for those choices, such as how they deal with children in that 
situation.75 These are complicated cases, since as Enright argues, victims of abuse 
have nothing for which to forgive themselves.76
Yet victims in these cases often feel implicated in the abuse and feel the need for 
self-forgiveness so the idea of responsibility is tied to the bad moral luck of being 
a victim.77 Dillon observes that we often find it difficult to forgive ourselves in 
these cases, and we risk being overly rationalistic if we do not take these feelings 
seriously.78 In other words, we should not draw too sharp a line between acts 
that call for self-forgiveness and acts that are not “objectively” wrong; rather we 
should consider the experience of the person who feels guilt, regret, and remorse 
as the most crucial factor. The person who cannot forgive themselves feels angry, 
bitter, cynical, and “beats themselves up” a common expression used to indicate 
the notion of punishment of the self. Another way to describe the phenomenon 
is self-destructive behaviour, which can be manifested in thoughts and feelings 
or even in physical self-abuse. Their own lack of self-forgiveness is something 
that itself calls for self-forgiveness. Thus we should not forget that situations of 
oppression may make self-forgiveness difficult and even impossible if the person 
cannot see a way to change. In general, I argue that we can forgive ourselves for 
wrongs done to others in some circumstances without the victim forgiving us, 
for wrongs done to ourselves, and for wrongs done to ourselves through what we 
do to others. There is still the different question, however, as to whether we can 
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forgive ourselves in extreme cases.  
6. SHOULD WE FORGIVE OURSELVES? FOR WHAT EXTREMITY OF 
WRONGS? 
Arendt may be correct that we cannot see ourselves as others see us. Nevertheless, 
as I have argued so far, we may be able to see ourselves sufficiently to find the basis 
for self-forgiveness. The answer to the question of the ethics of self-forgiveness—
whether we should forgive ourselves—is going to depend to some extent on the 
extremity of the wrong and thus there may be wrongs to self and others, and to the 
self through wrongs to others, that cannot be forgiven. In the context of action, 
Arendt sees forgiveness as being “released from the consequences of what we have 
done.”79 However, there are some crimes and “willed evil” that are unforgiveable 
on her account.80 In the context of self-forgiveness, we cannot release ourselves 
from all the consequences of our actions. We may rely on others to do that in the 
case of crimes, but even when there has not been a crime as such, our actions 
could be unforgivable. 
Forgiveness of the self can include forgiveness for trivial faults, or “trespassing,” 
or acting unknowingly, as Arendt calls it.81 One example here is Elizabeth 
Bennet in Pride and Prejudice, who could probably fairly easily forgive herself 
for her prejudices against Darcy.82 I have argued, following Immanuel Kant, that 
forgiveness is an imperfect duty. or duty of sympathy.83 In other words, forgiveness 
is not generally strictly obligatory. However, as in the case of forgiveness of others, 
if the wrong is very slight, and we have made it up to ourselves, forgiveness could 
become a kind of obligation. For example, if we were to do something very trivial, 
like complain about the coffee somewhere or forget to go to someone’s birthday 
party, incidents that are probably quickly forgotten by others, then we should 
forgive ourselves for them.84 Furthermore, we should aim to be generally forgiving 
of ourselves as of others, since non-forgivingness of faults, particularly trivial 
ones, is suggestive of a character flaw or at least of some psychological problem, 
in being too harsh on ourselves or too proud. So forgiveness for these lesser faults 
should be something we aim for, along with what Dillon calls preservative self-
forgiveness, a future-oriented self-forgivingness and acceptance of ourselves as 
worthwhile human beings who sometimes make mistakes. 
Forgiveness for extreme crimes raise special puzzles, especially when we consider 
it is often difficult and/ or unethical for victims to forgive extreme wrongdoing 
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like rape, murder, torture, or genocide. Raskolnikov’s self-forgiveness after being 
imprisoned for murder in Crime and Punishment, if that’s what it is, happens 
mysteriously through a religious conversion that begins a rebirth, a “gradual 
regeneration, of his gradual passing from one world to another, of his acquaintance 
with a new and hitherto unknown reality.”85 In extreme cases, one could consider 
that it is possible to live with oneself, or reconcile, without forgiving oneself, as 
I suggested earlier.86 Life could become just tolerable without a person entirely 
giving up on resentment or anger against oneself.87 Forgiveness is not always 
possible even though it could be possible in principle, if the offender were able 
to take responsibility and atone for what they have done. Self-forgiveness may 
depend on whether the victim is able to forgive and if they are present to consider 
forgiving.88 Many views that consider self-forgiveness always appropriate are 
focused on acts, where we might look back on them and believe we have changed 
in fundamental ways since committing them. However, if we consider the problem 
of a serious fault—such as realising that one has a racist character that we are 
unable to transform—then it may be appropriate to remain angry with oneself. 
Also, some acts may be so extreme that they are judged unforgivable, either by 
others or ourselves. If we are to understand self-forgiveness in any of these cases, 
we need to examine what reasons we might have for forgiving ourselves or not 
doing so.
7. WHY SHOULD WE FORGIVE OURSELVES? 
In the literature, there are two main approaches to the grounds for forgiveness, 
one that focuses on respect, and the other that stresses love in certain forms. In 
the case of self-forgiveness, is self-respect sufficient to ground self-forgiveness 
or do we need self-love in the form of compassion and empathy for ourselves? 
Dillon argues that we can forgive ourselves, although we should not always do so, 
and sometimes we are appropriately left with self-reproaches.89 She centres on 
“transformative” self-forgiveness, concerned with our past acts, (as opposed to 
preservative self-forgiveness) and how it can be compatible with evaluative self-
respect (in contrast to recognition and basal self-respect) if we go through the 
appropriate processes.90 Although we might still feel self-reproach, it does not have 
such a powerful hold on us.91 Herman Melville leaves it unclear whether Captain 
Vere forgives himself for ensuring the hanging of Billy Budd for accidentally 
killing the man who brings false charges against him, but since he dies with Billy’s 
name on his lips, we can be sure that he was disturbed.92 We cannot necessarily 
overcome every aspect of what we have done wrong through self-forgiveness. Our 
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self-respect tells us that we have worth in spite of the wrong we have done as 
human beings, and many ethical theories will tell us that we all have worth. But 
does our worth mean that we should be forgiven? 
Dillon believes self-respect is enough for self-forgiveness, but do not we need self-
love in the form of empathy and compassion as well?93 While I accept self-respect 
is necessary, I am inclined to believe that love in some form will foster forgiveness 
and is also necessary to a healthy sense of self. Arendt notes that love is sufficient 
for forgiveness in the private sphere.94 However, we may need both respect and 
love for forgiveness of self or other. Then we can forgive ourselves, in some way 
modelled on what Norlock calls third-party forgiveness, by feeling empathy for 
ourselves, or an aspect of ourselves.95 What we need to do is have empathy for 
our own past and present selves, and be able to see ourselves as “both agents and 
victims.”96 She argues that self-forgiveness is part of a project of regaining moral 
integrity, taking responsibility, living up to our moral ideals, and developing hope 
and trust.97 We could also distinguish between empathy and compassion here. Do 
we feel compassion towards the self?98 The character of Briony in Ian McEwan’s 
Atonement can be seen as someone who has had to exercise a compassionate and 
imaginative response to her own wrongdoing, especially since the people she has 
wronged are not alive to do this for her. 99 We have to have some kind of feeling or 
attitude that looks on our own actions with imaginative understanding and sees 
that we are not fully defined by them and may be worthy of forgiveness. Then we 
can enter into the action of self-forgiveness, which will enable us to lead a better 
kind of life.
Finally, another question: is it hard to forgive ourselves or too easy? Dillon, for 
example, argues that forgiving ourselves is more difficult than forgiving others.100 
This idea is in contrast to Griswold’s view that people sometimes forgive 
themselves with “lightning speed.”101 Here what we see is that the more ethically 
concerned a person is, the less likely they are to forgive themselves, whereas the 
less ethically concerned they are, the more likely they are to forgive themselves, 
thus leading to extremes in both types of cases. It is not clear that we can make 
either generalisation, just that we will tend to see these extremes as they are self-
reinforcing. So we need to take particular care to note which way we might be 
tending. 
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CONCLUSION
From my discussion of the phenomenon of self-forgiveness, it appears to be 
possible, at least in the personal rather than political sense. Furthermore, such 
forgiveness of the self could be compatible with Arendt’s view of forgiveness, 
as outlined in The Human Condition, if we separate political forgiveness from 
personal forgiveness, and focus on personal forgiveness of the self. What Arendt 
rules out is self-forgiveness as self-pardon for crimes, a rare and controversial 
phenomenon sometimes considered by heads of state since only they appear to 
have such a power. Nevertheless, what we can take from Arendt’s idea of self-
forgiveness being dependent on the forgiveness of others is the reality that others 
generally play a role in self-forgiveness: we cannot forgive ourselves really ‘shut 
up within ourselves.” We usually need the support and comfort of others to 
be able to forgive ourselves. It is very difficult, sometimes more difficult than 
forgiving others, and there may be times when we should not forgive ourselves. 
Yet self-forgiveness, just as Arendt says of forgiveness of the other, can allow the 
possibility of starting something new. It is a kind of magic spell that shares the 
miraculous quality of forgiveness and promising others. 102
—University of Queensland
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